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Abstract
This document presents a system-of-systems (SoS) case study as used in the
COMPASS project. The case study centres on a major incident attended by
emergency services, based on the London Emergency Services Liaison Panel
(LESLP) Major Incident Procedure Manual. The document details the entities
involved in a major incident (forming the constituent systems), their internal
procedures and behaviour, interactions between entities, and considers system-
level and SoS-level properties.
1 Introduction
The London Emergency Services Liaison Panel (LESLP) major incident proce-
dure manual [5] summarises procedures and arrangements for the coordination of
the London emergency services (including the Metropolitan Police, London Fire
Brigade and London Ambulance Service) and other services (National Health
Service, Local Authority, etc.) in the event of a major incident. In the case
study presented in this report, we consider a subset of the entities of the LESLP
manual and simplify the operational procedures.
The aims of this case study are as follows:
• To define a simple SoS which may inform experiments and analyses in the
COMPASS project.
• To identify SoS-level properties which may be analysed.
• To illustrate the use of SysML for a small SoS. This may help inform areas
of SysML in which formal definitions may be embedded/derived.
In this case study, each emergency service detailed may be considered a
heterogeneous system. Given the characteristics of a system-of-systems (SoS) by
Maier [6], we consider the collaboration of the emergency services during a major
incident to be a SoS. Each service has independent operation and management,
the functions and membership of the response and the emergency services change
over time, behaviour emerges from the combination of service functions, and the
emergency services may be geographically distributed.
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Given the procedure manual and our belief that the entities defined therein
may be considered a SoS, we propose the use of [5] to form the basis of a
useful working example in COMPASS. To meet the aims of the document it
is sufficient to limit the scope of our study by considering only a subset of
the entities described in [5], and by simplifying the procedures the constituent
systems undertake (for example the first response processes of the emergency
services).
We illustrate this subset with a number of SysML diagrams to aid in the
understanding of the working example and to aid in further modelling tasks in
the COMPASS project.
A long term aim within the COMPASS project is to update this document
with new material as the project progresses. As such, major versions will be
released with changes highlighted.
The remainder of this document is structured as follows: in Section 2 we
outline an ontology of the case study, and the constituent systems are defined
in Section 3. Section 4 presents the processes the different constituent systems
perform during the major incident. In Section 5, we present several require-
ments which the different stakeholders must adhere to, and use cases detailing
the contexts in which the stakeholders must meet these requirements. Section 6
considers a scenario within the case study related to the release of casualty in-
formation, defines several properties which must be respected by the emergency
service and the whole SoS and addresses the interaction of constituents involved
in the scenario.
2 Case Study Ontology
In the diagram of the case study ontology, the important entities of the case
study are presented, together with how they are related. In Figure 1, we present
a SysML block definition diagram (BDD) detailing the ontology.
Figure 1: Block definition diagram detailing the ontology of Major Incident
A Major Incident (MI) is triggered by at least one of four criteria. We may
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see that the MI case study contains 4 stages – an initial response, consolidation,
recovery and restoration of normality. The MI also contains a response con-
sisting of the emergency services and communication systems. The emergency
services personnel take on a role with responsibilities. These responsibilities are
realised though processes. The processes are executed over the different stages
of the MI, and are comprised of incident detection, first response and others not
detailed in this document. Finally, Figure 1 introduces the three cordons of the
MI.
3 Constituent Systems
In this case study, each emergency service is considered to be a heterogeneous
system. The characteristics of Maier [6] – operational independence, managerial
independence, distribution, evolutionary development and emergence – indicate
that the collaboration of the emergency services during a major incident consti-
tutes a system-of-systems (SoS). This SoS is referred to as the Major Incident
Response (MIR).
The MIR structure is given in Figure 2 as a Block Definition Diagram (BDD).
The MIR contains up to three emergency services and up to three communica-
tion systems. The emergency services (ES) may be a police force, a fire brigade
or ambulance service. All ESs include more than one person, which each have a
single role. The communication systems of the MIR include a dispatch system
and radio handsets to be used by the ES personnel.
Figure 2: Block definition diagram depicting Major Incident Response structure
The roles undertaken by the ES personnel may be either First Responder,
Bronze, Silver or Gold - as is shown in Figure 3. Each role has several respon-
sibilities which ES personnel must undertake in order to realise the processes of
the major incident.
The London Emergency Service Liaison Panel (LESLP) manual [5], sum-
marises procedures and responsibilities of the emergency services (e.g. police,
fire, or ambulance) in response to a major incident. Once a major incident is
declared (usually by a member of the police service) a response is put in place
by each of the services necessary to deal with that incident.
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Figure 3: Block definition diagram depicting Emergency Services personnel roles
A typical response involves several levels of command: referred to as Bronze,
Silver, and Gold. Each service has members working at each level, so we may
refer to Bronze Police or Silver Fire. Each level and service has different re-
sponsibilities. For example, an early and important responsibility of the Bronze
Police is to put appropriate cordons in place to prevent members of the public
form becoming involved in the incident, and in come cases to preserve evidence.
Silver and Gold commands work in inter-agency coordinating groups. Bronze,
Silver and Gold can be seen as terms for the well-known strategic, tactical and
operational levels of command. Bronze implements tactics defined by Silver.
Silver formulates tactics to be adopted by each service following strategy de-
termined by Gold. Gold command, geographically distant, contains the service
commanders.
An early and important responsibility of the Police is to put appropriate
cordons in place to prevent members of the public from becoming involved in
the incident, and in come cases to preserve evidence.
Personnel at a common level may communicate freely, but between adjacent
levels communication is only between agents of the same service. Information
flow out of the MIR is subject to several alternative policies. Certain infor-
mation may be independently released to the media by an individual service,
but casualty figures must be cleared by Gold Police. Potential communication
and clearance policies for information relating to casualty clearance have been
analysed in [1].
The environment of the MIR SoS comprises the incident scene (and the
cordons surrounding the scene), members of public and the media.
4 Process Modelling
The emergency services of the MIR SoS each contain many people, each taking
on a role. A role takes on responsibilities realised during a number of processes.
This is depicted in Figure 1. In defining the processes of the MI case study, we
follow the process modelling approach as detailed by Holt [3]. In Section 4.1
we consider the processes of the MI case study and in Section 4.2 detail the
behaviour exhibited in each process. Section 4.3 considers how the processes
may be arranged during the life of the Major Incident.
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4.1 Process Content View
Given the ontology in Section 1, we may expand further on the processes oc-
curring during the lifecycle of a major incident by defining a Process Content
View (PCV), given in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Block definition diagram depicting Process Content View of Major
Incident
The PCV provides an overview of the different processes executing over the
stages of the MI life cycle. Figure 4 presents the incident detection and first
response processes of the MI (as noted in Section 2, this list is incomplete),
modelled as SysML blocks. The diagram indicates the activities of each process
(represented as SysML operations) and the relevant artefacts (inputs and out-
puts of the activities – represented as SysML properties). Note the collection of
processes occurring during during the MI in Figure 4 is marked as incomplete,
and requires further processes to be defined.
4.2 Process Behaviour Views
Given the Process Content View, we may consider the various Process Behaviour
Views (PBV) of each process with respect to the different emergency service
types defined in Section 3. The incident detection process is detailed in Figure 5,
and the remaining processes relating to the police, fire and ambulance emergency
services are given in Appendix B.
The PBV describes the flow of activities in a process, denoted by the rounded
rectangle. Artefacts are input and output from the activities, shown as small
boxes with directions appended to the activity blocks. Decision points are drawn
as small diamonds (referred to in SysML as pins). In the incident detection
process, detailed in Figure 5, we see a simple flow of activity, started by an ex-
ternal call to the incident. The process, performed by a stakeholder performing
the First Officer role, subsequently follows a number of activities to determine
whether an incident is described as major.
4.3 Process Instance View
The processes defined in the Process Context View in Section 4.1 above may be
arranged in a number of ways. We provide an example in the form of a Process
5
Figure 5: Activity diagram depicting Process Behaviour View of incident detec-
tion process
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Instance View in Figure 6.
Figure 6: Sequence diagram depicting Process Instance View of incident detec-
tion process and subsequent first response processes.
It should be noted that this is only one of many variations on this sequence.
For example, there may be a case whereby a number of initial detection processes
are involved. This may occur when the first officers on scene do not have the
experience or expertise to decide if an incident is classed as major.
5 Requirement Modelling
The next stage of modelling involves the Requirement Modelling technique,
described by Holt and Perry [4, 2]. This technique aims to help identify and
decompose the requirements, and consider how the requirements are related to
the stakeholders of the major incident.
In Section 5.1 we consider a collection of requirements we wish to hold over
the MIR SoS. Section 5.2 considers these in different contexts through use case
diagrams.
5.1 Requirements
Given the LESLP procedure manual, we see four main requirements of the
Major Incident Response: save lives, combine resources, investigate the incident
and handle enquiries1. This is depicted in the Requirements Diagram (RD) in
Figure 15. The top level requirement respond to major incident is decomposed
into the aforementioned four requirements.
Each of these top-level requirements are decomposed further in separate
RDs, we show only one example in this document; those requirements relating
to the clearance of casualty information in Figure 8. The remaining RDs are
given in Appendix A. The level of detail given for each requirement varies, as
is realistic, and as such any requirements requiring further decomposition are
marked as incomplete.
Whilst we do not propose adding more detail to the requirements, each
requirement may be given unique identifiers and natural text descriptions.
1This may evolve as more details are added to the case study.
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Figure 7: Requirements Diagram showing top-level requirements for the Major
Incident Response SoS
Figure 8: Requirements Diagram showing break down of the Handle Enquiries
requirement for the Major Incident Response SoS
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5.2 Context Diagrams
As stated by Holt and Perry [2], one use of SysML use case diagrams is to define
Context Diagrams (CDs). These diagrams aim to indicate how the requirements
from Section 5.1 relate to the different contexts – the roles – of the Major
Incident Response SoS. The context diagrams for the Gold Police, Bronze Fire
and Silver Ambulance roles are given in Figures 9, 10 and 11. Note each of these
context diagrams are incomplete and show only those requirements relevant to
the release of casualty information.
Figure 9: Use Case Diagram showing the press enquiry requirement in the
context of a Gold Police officer
The CD in Figure 9 considers the Gold Police role which relates to three
requirements: collect casualty information, casualty information sent to Gold
Police and release cleared casualty information. The Gold Police collaborate
with all three Bronze roles in the collect casualty information requirement, with
the Silver Ambulance in the casualty information sent to Gold Police require-
ment (where the Silver Ambulance are responsible for passing this information
to the Gold Polcie) and finally the Gold Police collaborate with the Media to
release cleared casualty information.
The Bronze Fire role is shown in the CD in Figure 10. As with all Bronze
roles in the release of information, the Bronze Fire role is related to the Police
Gold in the collect casualty information requirement (and thus is consistent with
the Police Gold context diagram), and also related to the Silver Ambulance in
the verify casualty information requirement.
The final CD of the document is that for the Silver Ambulance role in Fig-
ure 11. The Silver Ambulance role has responsibility for the casualty information
sent to Gold Police requirement with the Gold Police and the verify casualty
information requirements with of the each Bronze roles.
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Figure 10: Use Case Diagram showing the press enquiry requirement in the
context of a Bronze Fire officer
Figure 11: Use Case Diagram showing the press enquiry requirement in the
context of a Silver Ambulance officer
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Considering each CD, we may identify interfaces between the constituent
systems of the response SoS and also the media. For, example in Figure 10,
there must exist an interface between the Bronze Fire role and Silver Ambulance
role to achieve the requirement Verify Casualty Information. We return to this
in Section 6.2.
6 Casualty Clearance
In this section, an example scenario within the major incident case study is ad-
dressed. As the MIR SoS is large and contains many different tasks, attention is
restricted to the tasks related to the release of casualty figures. Section 6.1 gives
several properties that must hold over the response relating to the release of ca-
sualty information, Section 6.2 details the interactions between the constituents
involved in the scenario and Section 6.3 considers an example sequence of events.
6.1 Example Properties
The purpose of this section is present some of the properties that could be
asserted of the major incident response SoS. These can be seen as examples of
the type of requirement made in documents describing SoSs, and are meant to
be relatively realistic. They therefore have varying levels of precision.
For the purposes of the document, the properties are divided into external
and internal properties. External properties are those at the interface between
the major incident response SoS and its environment (as described in Section 3).
Internal properties are those at the interfaces between the constituents of the
SoS.
The properties in this document relate to the release of casualty figures2. In
the early stages of a major incident, it is common for differing and inaccurate
estimates for the number of casualties involved to be released to the public.
This is considered undesirable, as it can add to uncertainty and panic in the
population. It can happen because they are merely media estimates, generated
by contacting local hospitals and interviewing survivors. Alternatively they
can be figures released by various parts of the SoS (hospitals, Bronze Police,
etc.). This can lead to double-counting of casualties. Below are some possible
properties that may be required of the SoS to prevent this. These are not
intended to all apply simultaneously, but to be examples of the kind of property
that a SoS might be expected to adhere to.
It is assumed that estimates of casualty figures are made by Bronze personnel
attending the scene at the early stages of a major incident.
Below, we give descriptions of the properties, with an indication to the type
of property (internal/external)3.
1. External Over the course of the major incident, the casualty figures re-
leased from the SoS to the public must not decrease.
2There are a large number of properties which may be present in other aspects of the SoS
which are not detailed here.
3Interestingly, many of these are external properties. They become internal because sole
authority for releasing casualty figures resides with the Police Gold.
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2. External Unverified casualty figures must never be released to the general
public.
3. Internal Only Police Gold is authorised to release casualty figures.
4. Internal Estimates (which will usually be made by Bronze personnel)
must be verified then passed to Gold.
5. Internal If casualties figures passed to Gold are estimates, they must be
marked as such.
6. External Once casualty figures are verified, the figures must be released
to the media/general public within one hour unless there is good reason
for them not to be released.
7. Internal If verified casualty figures are not released, the reasons for the
decision must be recorded.
8. External The number of verified casualties must not be more than the
estimated number, and the number released must not be more than the
verified number.
9. External Only one set of figures should be released at any time.
10. Internal Ambulance press officers may confirm the general nature of types
of injuries – unless police specifically request them not to – and the hos-
pitals to which they are taken.
6.2 Internal Block Diagrams
The constituent systems clearly communicate in many ways, depending on the
context within the overall response. This section considers how the constituent
systems may communicate within the release clearance figures scenario. An In-
ternal Block Diagram (IBD) is given for the response which details the provided
and required interfaces of the elements of the MIR SoS relevant to the release
of casualty numbers. The IBD is given in Figure 12.
The constituents of the MIR SoS are the Police, Fire and Ambulance offi-
cers, each with a specified role. The interfaces provided and required of these
officers depend upon the roles undertaken by the constituents. These connec-
tions correspond to the interactions of the roles in the Context Diagrams in
Section 5.2. For example, in Figure 10, there exists some collaboration between
the Bronze Fire and Silver Ambulance roles in the verify casualty information
requirement. In the IBD of Figure 12, an interface verify exists between the
Fire Officer with a Bronze role and the Ambulance Officer with Silver role. For
each collaboration in the CDs, an interface should exist.
The interfaces depicted in Figure 12 are defined in the BDD in Figure 13.
The four interfaces contain operation signatures related to a given point of
interaction for those operations made public by the relevant constituents. The
signatures only define the data input to and output from an operation call.
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Figure 12: Internal Block Diagram showing relationships of response con-
stituents when releasing casualty figures
Figure 13: Block Definition Diagram showing interface definitions when releas-
ing casualty figures
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6.3 Sequence Diagrams
Given the IBD of Section 6.2, we may consider an example Sequence Diagram
(SD) depicting the operation calls between the constituent systems involved in
the release of casualty details to the media. It should be stressed that this is
one example of the possible interactions. The SD is defined in Figure 14.
Figure 14: Sequence Diagram showing an operation sequence when releasing
casualty figures
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This report models the LESLP major incident procedure manual using SysML.
The SoS in the case study was identified along with the constituent systems. Us-
ing process and requirements modelling techniques, we identified the processes
the different constituent systems perform during the major incident, the require-
ments which the different stakeholders must adhere to, and use cases detailing
the contexts in which the stakeholders must meet these requirements. Given a
scenario within the case study related to the release of casualty information, we
considered several properties which must be respected by the emergency service
and the whole SoS.
This is an initial study. As mentioned in Section 1, a long term aim within
the COMPASS project is to update this document with new material as the
project progresses. One avenue of further work we envisage is in the inter-
face specification considered in Section 6.2. Interfaces may be modelled further
in SysML and also more formal specification notations such as VDM and CSP.
Modelling the case study using the CML language, to be produced in the COM-
PASS, is also envisaged as future work. The collection of properties relating to
the release of casualty information provides a series of analysis challenges for
the further modelling exercises.
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A Requirement Modelling Diagrams
A.1 Top-Level Requirements
Figure 15: Requirements Diagram showing top-level requirements for the Major
Incident Response SoS
A.2 Second-Level Requirements
Figure 16: Requirements Diagram showing break down of the Save Lives re-
quirement for the Major Incident Response SoS
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Figure 17: Requirements Diagram showing break down of the Save Lives re-
quirement for the Major Incident Response SoS
Figure 18: Requirements Diagram showing break down of the Save Lives re-
quirement for the Major Incident Response SoS
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A.3 Context Diagrams
Figure 19: Use Case Diagram showing the press enquiry requirement in the
context of a Gold Police officer
Figure 20: Use Case Diagram showing the press enquiry requirement in the
context of a Silver Ambulance officer
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Figure 21: Use Case Diagram showing the press enquiry requirement in the
context of a Bronze Police officer
Figure 22: Use Case Diagram showing the press enquiry requirement in the
context of a Bronze Ambulance officer
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Figure 23: Use Case Diagram showing the press enquiry requirement in the
context of a Bronze Fire officer
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B Process Modelling Diagrams
B.1 Process Content View
Figure 24: Block definition diagram depicting Process Content View of Major
Incident
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B.2 Process Behaviour Views
Figure 25: Activity diagram depicting Process Behaviour View of incident de-
tection process
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Figure 26: Activity diagram depicting Process Behaviour View of Police first
response process
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Figure 27: Activity diagram depicting Process Behaviour View of Fire first
response process
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Figure 28: Activity diagram depicting Process Behaviour View of Ambulance
first response process
B.3 Process Instance View
Figure 29: Sequence diagram depicting Process Instance View of incident de-
tection process and subsequent first response processes.
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